  Introduction
Suppose that a is F in virtue of being G. Does this mean everything that's G is F for that reason?
It would initially seem so. As Rosen () writes:
If Fred is handsome in virtue of his symmetrical features and deep green eyes, then anyone with a similar face would have to be handsome for the same reason. Particular grounding facts must always be subsumable under general laws, or so it seems.
(, p. )
Audi () delivers the same verdict:
Let us suppose that you have a (defeasible) reason to believe that P in virtue of a certain sensory experience…It is not peculiar to you that when you have this experience, it grounds a reason of the relevant sort. Anyone with an experience of the same kind will have a reason of precisely the same kind.
[Thus] grounding relations do not vary from instance to instance of the properties involved in the facts in question.
Similarly, they do not vary from world to world. (, pp. -) Following Rosen (), we can refer to the principle gestured towards here as Weak Formality.
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This states that if some (possible) object a is F in virtue of being G, then if any possible object b is G, b is F in virtue of being G.
2
That is:
1 For the stronger principle, Formality, see Rosen (, p. ). 2 Cf. Rosen (, p. ): Weak Formality 'tells us that if some possible thing is green in virtue of having a certain spectral reflectance profile, then as a matter of necessity, anything with that profile is green in virtue of possessing it'.

To say that some fact Γ grounds another fact ∆ is to say that ∆ obtains in virtue of . That is, it's to say that the latter fact constitutes the ontological basis for the former fact. So if grounds ∆, then is the more fundamental of the two, and ∆ is the less fundamental (and more derivative). 5 Moreover, if grounds ∆, then there's a non-causal, constitutive sense in which ∆ holds because does.
To use a metaphor from Schaffer () , the relation between grounding and causation can be thought of like so: whilst causation drives the world through time, grounding drives the world through levels. Causation takes us from one event occurring at a time to another event occurring at a later time. The former event is thus causally generative of the latter. Whereas grounding takes us from some more fundamental fact to another, less fundamental fact. The former fact is therefore ground-theoretically generative of the latter.
As this brings out, both causation and grounding are 'building' or 'generative' relations (cf. Bennett: ), and hence relations of determination. Moreover, both relations back distinctive types of explanation. If event e causes event e, then e occurs because e occurs-in a causal sense of 'because'. Likewise, if fact grounds distinct fact ∆, then ∆ obtains because of Γ -in a constitutive sense of 'because '. 6 Unlike some authors, I don't identify grounding with metaphysical explanation (Moran: under review explains part of the reason why). (Although the latter relation can, of course, also be expressed with phrases like 'because' and 'in virtue of'.) In my view, just as we should distinguish the causal relation from the causal explanations it backs, so we should distinguish grounding from the metaphysical explanations it 5 Plausibly, grounding can be one-one, many-one, and perhaps even many-many. But here I am interested in one-one cases. (Throughout I follow let ' and '∆' stand for arbitrary individual facts.) 6 For more on the relation between grounding and causation see Schaffer () and Wilson (). backs. Accordingly, just as 'causation' and 'causal explanation' are distinct, so too 'grounding' and 'metaphysical explanation' are distinct. (For more on this matter see Schaffer: .) I've been writing as if grounding is a relation on facts. I'll continue to assume this in what follows. (However, I will also speak loosely of, e.g., 'x's Gness grounding x's Fness'. This should be taken as an informal expression of the claim that: the fact that x is F is grounded by the fact that x is G.) Note, however, that this assumption is contestable in various ways. Most of what I say here could probably be reformulated without the assumption that grounding is a relation between facts (were one to disagree with this idea). But I'll assume the truth of this throughout.
I'll close with some remarks about the logical properties of ground. It's standard to assume that grounding is reflexive, asymmetric, transitive, and well-founded. We thus obtain a well-founded partial ordering over the domain of facts. Now to my ) Accordingly, we can now turn to the main purpose of this paper. This is to explain how we can reject Weak Formality. So let us now turn to this task.
 for that reason. Specifically, the thought is that there might be some difference between a and b, such that when a is G, a is F in virtue of being G, although when b is G, it's not so that b is F for that reason. Now there are various ways to develop this idea. In what follows, however, I
shall develop it in a specific manner, by appealing to two resources: the broadly neoAristotelian idea of fundamental kind, and the notion of conditional grounding.
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. Fundamental Kinds
There is a view, broadly Aristotelian in spirit, whereby all objects belong to (only) one (most specific) fundamental kind. We can introduce this idea like so. Now intuitively, there is a difference between saying what a thing is as opposed to merely saying how it is (cf. Fine: b, p. ; Wiggins: , p. ). This intuitive thought can be regimented by saying that to specify merely how something is, 10 There are other ways to develop Rosen's idea. But as I say in this paper I offer just one way of developing that idea out of perhaps several. (It is of perhaps of interest that the view I develop in this paper allows for the 'property aspect' of the fact Ga to do all the grounding work in making Fa hold, (despite also allowing for Weak Formality to fail), for on my view what the object contributes is merely an enabling condition-when the object a is of the right kind it enables Ga to ground Fa (just what this means will become clearer in the sequel), but holding this is quite compatible with saying that it is the predicable aspect of the fact 'Ga' that 'does grounding the work' in making it so that Fa. Whereas what Rosen himself seems to think is that it could happen that when Ga grounds Fa, then it is somehow the combined powers of a and G that form a fact with the power to make it so that Fa holds, but also that there might be some object b lacking in the power to combine with G to form a fact able to make it so that Gb. But obviously, this idea is not compatible with Audi's thought, for it implies that in some cases Ga only grounds Fa because both aspects of the fact Ga, i.e. both the object and the property, perform grounding work in making it so that Fa obtains. (I explore this alternative way of developing Rosen's idea and of rejecting Weak Formality in a different context in Moran: under review.) But again, on the view that I develop in this paper, we can remain neutral about which elements within the grounding fact 'Ga' perform the grounding work in making Fa hold, so long as we hold that Ga grounds Fa only given that a meets a certain condition, viz., that of being a certain kind of thing. (Thanks to Ralf Bader for discussion here.) one has to merely list its properties, whereas to specify what something is, one needs to specify its fundamental kind (i.e., to state what sort of thing x most fundamentally and essentially is). E.g., to say that x is an animal or a person is (arguably) to say what x is, it is to specify what kind of object we are dealing with. But the claim that x is white merely says how x happens to be. One specifies one of the object's properties; but fails to disclose its fundamental kind. The thought is brought out nicely by Wiggins in the following passage:
If somebody claims of something named or unnamed that it moves, or runs or is white, he is liable to be asked the question by which Aristotle sought to define the category of substance: What is it that moves (or runs or is white)? Perhaps one who makes the claim that something moves does not need to know the answer to this question in order to enter his claim. It is not hard to envisage circumstances in which he can know that it moves without knowing what the thing is. Yet it seems certain…that, for each thing that satisfies a predicate such as 'moves', 'runs' or 'white', there must exist some…kind to which the item belongs and by reference to which the 'what is it' question could be answered. (, p. ) In this paper, I take this basic framework for granted (the rationale being: it can do valuable metaphysical work). I assume also one particular element of the framework, viz., that fundamental kinds can determine, in at least some cases, what properties their instances can have.
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One way to showcase the plausibility of this idea is 11 N.b., my view is consistent with claiming that even if being a K is what enables x to have (or disables x from having) certain properties F, G, H, x's being a K might not play this kind of role with respect to all of x's properties. For it might be that e.g. even if x's being a K is what enables x to be F and/or disables x from being G, there are some properties that x has/lacks which x's being a K has nothing whatsoever to do with. Indeed, my view is even consistent with some kinds failing to do any metaphysical work conditioning which properties a thing can/cannot instantiate-so that what via examples. If e.g. x is a proposition, then plausibly, x is essentially and most fundamentally so. It is plausible, therefore, to think it's because x is a proposition that x can have certain features and not others. For instance, a proposition may be true or false, but neither red nor blue. Plausibly, this is because propositions are not the kind of thing that can be coloured, but are the kind of thing that can have truthvalues. We can therefore explain why propositions can have truth-values but not colours by appealing to what kind of thing they most fundamentally are.
Manifold further examples are possible. A sphere may be misshapen, but not ungrammatical. A wedding can be joyous or boring, but not prime of even. A heap of sand (plausibly) can't survive a change in parts, whereas animals and plants seemingly can. All these differences in properties, quite plausibly, are traceable in some sense to the fundamental kind the relevant item instantiates.
In general, then, the kind of object something most fundamentally is can determine the properties it may have. That is the view I am adopting.
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If we allow that fundamental kinds may determine what properties their instances may have, then it appears we should grant also that fundamental kinds determine which grounding relations their instances are/aren't able to enter into. 13 If, for example, an object x is of fundamental kind K, and if for that reason, it is properties a thing has turns out to turn not at all on its fundamental kind. (However, what I do need is for kinds to play the roles assigned to them in ( §) and ( §) in order to solve the relevant puzzles.) 12 However, this view must be understood in the right way. The official view is that kind of thing that something is determines which non-basic properties it may have for some properties and in some kinds only. So I do not say that a thing's fundamental kind fixes its modal profile entirely, so that x's being fundamentally a K determines the full range of properties x is able to have. Perhaps x could not have had another origin than the one it has. This is surely a fact about the properties x can/cannot have that does not trace to its fundamental kind (cf. fn.  above. (As for non-basic/basic properties: a property F is non-basic for x iff there is a m basic property G in virtue of which x has F. A property F is basic for x iff it is not non-basic for x, i.e. there is no property x has F in virtue of.) 13 But note again that this need not always be so. Perhaps some kinds do not determine what properties a thing can have in virtue of what other properties. Cf. fn.  and fn. . I need claim only that this sometimes happens-and that it happens in the relevant cases in ( §) and ( §).
unable to have the property of being F, then it follows that x cannot be F in virtue of being G. Moreover, this will be so even if x is G, and, importantly, even if other things, which are not K's, are F in virtue of being G.
14 Return now to the case involving a and b. If we are to reject Weak Formality in a plausible way, then as per Rosen's suggestion, we must locate a relevant difference between these objects that could underwrite the fact that only a is F in virtue of Suppose that a is most fundamentally a K, whilst b is most fundamentally a K*, whereby Ks are able to be F, but K*s are not. Suppose also that both Ks and K*s can be G (as witnessed by the fact that both a and b, a K and a K* respectively, are G). In this situation, I claim the difference in fundamental kind between the objects can underwrite the fact that whilst a and b are both G, only a is F for that reason.
(Given that a is the kind of thing that can be F, whilst b is not, it is only a that can be F in virtue of being G, even though both a and b are G.) Acordingly, it is the difference in fundamental kind between a and b that makes it so that Ga grounds Fa, even though even whilst b is G, it is not so that Gb grounds Fb.
14 It might be, of course, that in some cases, if a thing is unable to have the grounded property because of the kind of thing it is, then for the same reason, it cannot have the grounding property. However, we should not assume in advance that all cases are like this. Perhaps in some instances, a thing can have the grounding property even though it cannot have the grounded properties that the grounding property is able to ground. Moreover, I shall be arguing in this paper (in ( §) and ( §) respectively) that at least two types of problem-case arise when some x is the kind of thing that can be G but not the kind of thing that can be F and therefore not the kind of thing that can be F in virtue of being G-even though other things (of other fundamental kinds) are F due to being G.

This is the beginning of the account I want ultimately to defend. As things stand, however, important details must be filled in. Consider, for example, the role that fundamental kinds play in the story. Are they to be conceived as partial grounds-so that when a is F in virtue of being G, a is F partly in virtue of being G and partly in virtue of being a K? Or is the role of fundamental kinds something different? Well, the answer has to be the latter, if the notion of kind-dependent grounding is to perform genuinely interesting work. For it is hardly news that one thing can be F partly in virtue of being G even if this isn't so for all the Gs and even if some Gs fail to be F entirely. But the really interesting possibility, introduced at the outset of this paper, is that one thing might be F solely in virtue of being G, even though there are some Gs that are not F for that reason. But if we want to make good on this possibility, then we cannot assign to fundamental kinds the role of partial grounds; but must assign instead some alternative role.
So: how are we to model the fact that a's being of kind K somehow determines that a is F in virtue of being G, without treating the fact that a is a K as a partial ground of the fact that a is F (alongside the fact that a is G)? What I suggest is that we should appeal to the claim that grounding relations can hold conditionally (in a sense articulated below).
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The role of fundamental kinds with respect to the relevant grounding relations can then be conceived as that of enabling/disabling (or failing to enable, which is importantly different from disabling) those grounding relations to obtain/from obtaining. (For instance, I will later claim that the statue is beautiful but the lump of clay it is coincident with is not. To make sense of this, I'll argue, we should say that whilst the statue is beautiful in virtue of having some 15 Again, however, this is not the only option. See Moran (under review) and fn.  above microphysical property the lump shares, the lump is not beautiful in virtue of having that property, since it, unlike the statue, is not the kind of thing that can be beautiful, and so cannot be beautiful in virtue of the microphysical property it shares with the statue. Moreover, the idea will be that kinds here play the role of conditions, not grounds; a distinction introduced in the next sub-section.
)
. Conditional Grounding
In the literature on causation, a distinction is sometimes drawn between causes and conditions.
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That is, it is sometimes claimed that there are cases wherein an event A causes a further event B only given that some background condition is met.
Absent this further condition, so the idea goes, and A would not be able to cause B.
(That is, whilst A would still obtain, it would not cause B.) As an example, one might claim that striking the match causes the fire only given that the background condition of oxygen being present is met. On this view, were oxygen to have been absent, striking the match would not have caused the fire. So whilst (the event that is) the striking of the match would still have occurred, it would have been unable to 16 The notion of conditional grounding is not my own. However, it has recently been put to work in a variety of theoretical contexts. For example, Fine (, ) argues that we need to make use of conditional grounding in order to properly model the role that existence facts play with respect to the holding of diachronic identities. Moreover, both Ralf Bader (manuscript-a) and Ted Sider (independently) argue that we should appeal to conditional grounding (which Sider calls 'grounding-qua') in order to handle the problem of truth-grounding universal generalisations. Lastly, Bader () has argued that we need the notion of conditional grounding in order to properly model the way in which reasons can vary across contexts (in this connection cf. Dancy: , Ch. ). In this paper, I will show how we can use the notion of conditional grounding to handle two further theoretical problems drawn from contemporary metaphysics, see § §-. (The notion of conditional grounding is also somewhat similar to the notion of an 'anchor' in Epstein: , which is again something that's not a ground but that enables other things to do their grounding work.) 17 For relevant discussion here see Bader (manuscript-b) , Dancy (, Ch. ) and Schaffer (). A classic source of scepticism about the distinction is Mill (, p. ).
cause the fire, due to the absence of a necessary background condition on this event performing its causal work, viz. the presence of oxygen.
To be clear, the thought here is not that conditions are just partial causes.
Rather, if C is a condition on A causing B, then, rather than being a further cause of B, C is that which enables the causal relation to hold between A and B in the first place (due to enabling A to do its causal work in generating B). From this idea, it follows that things can play a role in generating events without playing a causal role.
For, instead of playing a causal role, things can act as background conditions, which enable the causal relation to obtain between the effect and the cause due to enabling the cause to perform its causal work.
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I think a similar distinction can be drawn in the case of grounding.
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What we can claim is that, just as, in some cases, (at least on the view set out above), event A causes event B only given that background condition C is met, so too, fact Γ grounds fact ∆ only given that some condition is met. In short, the idea is that just as background conditions might be relevant to the production of an event without themselves being causes of that event, so too background conditions might be relevant to the obtaining of a fact without themselves being grounds of that fact. As Fine (, p.) summaries: '[C]ertain conditions may produce a background to other conditions having a determinative role even though they do not themselves 18 As an anonymous referee points out there is the view that ultimately the causes/conditions distinction is merely pragmatic and so has no real metaphysical weight (cf. Schaffer: ). Now, whilst I do not accept this view myself, I don't argue against it here. For all I need is that the reader recognise the cogency of a view whereby conditions are not causes but play a distinct, sui generis noncausal role of enabling/disabling causal relations between events to obtain/from obtaining. This can then be claimed as analogous to the view about grounds and conditions soon to be introduced later in the paper. (For arguments that we should recognise conditions as sui generis enablers and/or disablers on causal relations cf. Bader: manuscript-b and Dancy: , Ch. .) 19 For those who stress the ways in which grounding and causation are alike, such as Schaffer () and Wilson () , this idea should seem especially plausible, at least given that causation can be conditional in the relevant way (cf. here Fine: , p.). For advocates of conditional grounding see Bader (, manuscript-a), Fine (, ) and Sider (manuscript, esp. §..).
have a determinative role'. And as Bader (manuscript-a, p. ) writes: '[n]ot everything that plays a role in making it the case that something else is the case needs to play a grounding-role'. For 'things can also be relevant by being conditions that must be satisfied for other things to do their grounding work'.
To make sense of conditional grounding, we must distinguish the different roles things can play in making a fact obtain. Let Γ conditionally ground ∆, whereby the condition on this grounding relation holding is that Ф obtains. In this case, the grounding relation obtains solely between Γ and ∆. However, it holds between these facts only given that the condition, Ф, is met. Moreover, Γ and Ф play fundamentally different roles in making ∆ obtain: whereas Γ plays a grounding role, Ф plays the role of a condition, i.e., whereas Γ acts as the ground of ∆, Ф acts as the condition on the grounding relation between Γ and ∆ obtaining (the condition's role in making ∆ obtain being to enable Γ to do its grounding work, rather than acting as even a partial ground for ∆.)
Conditions, then, are not to be treated as partial grounds (just as conditions in the causal case are not to be thought of as further causes, at least on the view sketched above). Rather, they are to be understood as playing different roles entirely to grounds. 20 Specifically, they should be thought of as playing a sui generis role in helping to make it the case that certain facts obtain, by enabling the grounding rela- 20 In the causal case, one might want to allow the cause/condition distinction to stand, but treat it in a deflationary way and hold that really, conditions are just partial causes (cf. fn. ). One could of course hold an analogous position regarding the ground/cause distinction. In my view Bader (, manuscript-a) makes a convincing case (via appealing to absences) that a robust distinction between grounds and conditions can be drawn (at least if the conditions are disablers). However, one should keep in mind that by drawing a genuine and robust (so not merely pragmatic) distinction between conditions and grounds, one can do valuable metaphysical work, as will be proven in this paper (see § §-). So let's assume that grounds are sui generis enablers/disablers on grounding relations obtaining. We can then reveal the important metaphysical work that this distinction can do. tion to hold between the grounding and the grounded fact.
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Consequently, to understand conditional grounding, we have to draw a robust distinction between grounds and conditions, whereby conditions simply enable the relevant grounding relations to obtain. (I take this assumption as unproblematic here. But I realise that one could contest the grounds/conditions distinction in various ways.)
This is of course all rather schematic (but see the example at the end of ( §.)).
However, in ( §) and ( §), we will see two putative examples of conditional grounding at work. In these cases, the condition on the grounding relation holding will be that the object be fundamentally a certain kind of thing.
. Kinds as Conditions
With the notion of conditional grounding introduced, return to the case of the two objects a and b. Suppose that whilst a is the kind of thing that can be F, the same is not true of b. For this reason, (so the idea goes), a is F in virtue of being G, whilst b is not, although both items are G. The question we're now engaged with is: how are we to model this, i.e., how should we think about the role of fundamental kinds in making it so that a is F in virtue of being G whilst b is not? My suggestion is that we model this using the notion of conditional grounding, treating fundamental kinds as conditions. On this view, when a is F in virtue of being G, the grounding relation holds only given the condition that a is fundamentally a K. The fact that a is a K thus acts as an enabling condition on a being F in virtue of being G. That a is G is consequently the sole and full ground of the fact that a is F. Whereas that a is a K is simply what enables this grounding relation to obtain. As for b, that b is a K* acts as a disabler on b being F in virtue of being G. Given that b is of kind K*, and given that unlike Ks, K*s cannot be F, it follows that b cannot be F, and hence cannot be F in virtue of being G. So, although b is G, b is not F in virtue of being G, since b is not the kind of thing that can be F. (It might also be that b is not the kind of thing that can't be F, but rather simply not the kind of thing that can. Then in this case that b is a K* would fail to enable the relevant grounding relation from obtaining rather than positively disabling it from obtaining. In what follows, however, we can mostly prescind from this subtle distinction.)
Let's say that in general, cases where x is F in virtue of being G, but only on the condition that it's fundamentally a K, are cases of kind-dependent grounding. As we will see, once we allow that cases of kind-dependent grounding are possible, we can see that Weak Formality has to be rejected. For Weak Formality entails that if two things are G, and one of them is F in virtue of being G, then both are F in virtue of being G. However, this is not so if cases of kind-dependent grounding are possible.
For it might be that whilst both things are G, only one of them is the kind of thing that can be F, so only one of them is the kind of thing that can be F in virtue of being G. 22 22 Strictly speaking, Weak Formality is not proven to be false given only the bare possibility of cases of kind-dependent grounding. What is also needed is for it to be possibly the case that (i) things that are G are F in virtue of being G (so long as they are things of the right kind), and that (ii) two things, x and y, are both G, even though only one of them is the kind of thing that can be F (and so F in virtue of being G). The following two sections of this paper in effect provide the basis for a broadly abductive argument to the effect that cases of this kind are indeed possible.
In the following two sections, I explain how two outstanding problems within contemporary metaphysics can be handled when viewed as cases of kind-dependent grounding. This will provide us with broadly abductive reasons for accepting that cases of kind-dependent grounding are possible and that Weak Formality is false.
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Before moving on, one further thing must be said regarding fundamental kinds.
Earlier, I said that in specifying x's fundamental kind, one specifies what sort of being x essentially and most fundamentally is. That is, one says not merely how x is, but rather what x is. What I now want to add is that fundamental kinds are in another sense fundamental: that is, they fundamental not only in that they tell us what the object essentially and most fundamentally is, but also fundamental in that when something is of some fundamental kind K there is nothing in virtue of which that is so. In short: fundamental kinds are ground-theoretically fundamental since their instantiation is ungrounded.
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This view is plausible because, after all, specifying the fundamental kind of an object is to specify what sort of thing it essentially is. But arguably there is no need to explain why an item has the essence that it does.
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Explanation has to come to an end somewhere, and that it comes to an end 23 Certain variations on the notion of kind-dependent grounding may also be of interest. E.g. in place of kind-dependent grounding, one might consider the idea of essence-dependent grounding, or form-depending grounding, etc. In general, for any φ such that plausibly, what properties a thing is able to have is (at least in part) determined by its φ (its kind, its essence, its form, its mode of composition, etc.), one could defend the possibility of φ-dependent grounding. In this paper I focus on the idea that grounding can be conditional on kinds, but if one prefers one can develop the idea using essence or form (etc.). Much the same work could be done with these variant forms of φ-dependent grounding.
24 Strictly speaking, I need the claim that some fundamental kinds are like this, whereby the relevant fundamental kinds are those that figure in generating the problem cases with which this paper deals (in ( § and §). But plausibly a claim of this kind ought to be fully general. 25 For this reason, one might even think that facts regarding fundamental kinds are not even apt for being grounded, i.e. that they are 'autonomous' in the sense of Dasgupta (). For a Dasgupta argues, it looks plausible to think that the essential truths about an object are amongst the truths about that need not be grounded in the way that other truths about it might. So one might think that since fundamental kinds disclose the essence of an object they are not even being apt to be grounded and for this reason lack grounds. For my own part, however, I prefer the view that fundamental kinds are fundamental-ungrounded but within the grounding hierarchy-rather than auton-with the essence of an object looks like a rather plausible idea, as Hawthorne Of course this view of matters is not uncontroversial. Indeed, for some kinds, it may seem much more plausible to think that there must be some groundtheoretical explanation as to why the object is the kind of thing it is.
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Consider the kind statue, which one might plausibly take to be a fundamental kind in my sense (in saying that x is a statue one thereby says what x is, not merely how it is; indeed below, in ( §), I at least write as if I agree with this.) Now Fine writes:
Surely…there must be some [ground-theoretic] account of what is involved in being a statue or a piece of clay, from which it should then be apparent why a given object is the one rather than the other. (, p. ) So the worry is: not all fundamental kinds can be ungrounded (basic, fundamental) since at least some of them clearly demand ground-theoretic explanation.
There are various ways to respond to this objection. But my main reply is this.
As we will see in the next section, with the assumption being challenged by the objector about fundamental kinds in the background, i.e. that fundamental kinds omous. One reason for this is that Dasgupta's 'autonomous' truths are supposed to be 'unworldly' in the sense of Fine () . it is surely implausible to think that all of the particular facts about what kind of thing this is and that is etc. are 'unworldly' facts in this sense (thanks to Ralf Bader here).
26 N.b. the view that fundamental kinds are ground-theoretically fundamental is not built into the very notion of a fundamental kind. That is, one could in principle believe that each thing falls under a fundamental kind in the sense of that term introduced above without thinking that when they do fall under some such kind, there is nothing that grounds the fact that they fall under it. It just that in this paper, I also add the further claim that these facts are indeed ungrounded.
27 Thanks here to an anonymous referee for urging me to address this. Many believe that distinct material objects can coincide, i.e., wholly occupy the same region of space and be composed of the same microphysical parts at once. 28 Cf. Lewis's () defence of modal realism: the theoretical work that Lewisian possible worlds are said to do is meant to override the intuition that of course no such worlds exist.
29 I'll mention one other reply suggested to me by an anonymous referee would involve adapting an idea of Bennett (). The idea would be to say, presumably, that for each possible fundamental kind, there is an actual object that has it. I could then claim that there is no need to explain why any object instantiates the kind it does-just as Bennett claims in her paper (albeit with modal properties in place of fundamental kinds). The trouble with this move, however, is that this reply generates a plenitudinous ontology whereby every matter-filled region of space is literally 'chocka' with distinct coincident objects (as Bennett puts it). And whilst I'm not against not against coincidence as such, I do worry about there being masses of co-located objects. This view also leads to various problems, e.g. the many-persons problem (Chihara: ) and the personite problem (Johnston: ). (Relatedly, as both Ralf Bader and Mark Johnston (independently) noted, bringing in these legions of objects reintroduces the mighty host of conscious beings I try to avoid having to accept in ( §).) Lastly, this view may even undermine the entire enterprise of giving real definitions 'of the things themselves' that has been so central contemporary so much metaphysics (Leslie & Johnston: manuscript) . 30 Strictly speaking, one could have a view whereby fundamental kinds are non-basic and so grounded and still solve the puzzles of ( §) and ( §) in the same way (see fn.  and fn.  respectively), but there are tricky issues to deal with in both case, as the aforementioned footnotes prove.) Consider e.g. a statue and the lump of clay making it up. The statue seems unable to survive being squashed, for plausibly it must have a certain form or structure in order to exist, one it would lose if it were squashed. But the lump could survive being squashed. Accordingly, the statue and the lump differ in properties, and so by Leibniz's Law are distinct.
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Given this fact, the most plausible thing to say it seems is that they are distinct yet coincident objects.
Or consider a person and her body. The person wouldn't survive even a gentle death; with death the person ceases to be. The body, however, could well survive a gentle death. Accordingly, the person and her body are distinct. Again, given this fact, the most plausible view is that the person and her body are distinct, coincident items (see Sosa: , pp. - and Johnston: , p. ).
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In the next sub-section, I focus on cases involving coincident objects which instantiate different fundamental kinds (so I set aside alleged cases of 'same-kind coincidence').
33
Specifically, I focus on coincident objects that differ in (at least some of) their non-basic properties. The trouble, as we will see, is that it's difficult to make sense of how coincident objects could differ in such properties. What I will also show, however, is that we can ultimately make sensei this if we allow for cases of kind-dependent grounding and reject Weak Formality.
The following sub-section deals with an objection. What will emerge is the idea that plausibly, the kind of item something is can determine not only which non-31 Some philosophers have tried to resist this style of argument by appealing to 'predicational shifts' (though see Fine:  for some powerful criticisms of this move). Others have tried the considerably more radical option of rejecting Leibniz's Law, by appealing to some form of relative identity (for further discussion of these matters see Burke:  and Noonan: ).
32 Manifold similar examples could be given here. E.g., it is often said that a person would 'go with the brain' in a brain-transplant case, whilst the body would stay on the operating table. This again would appear to establish the distinctness of these items (cf. Shoemaker: ).
33 In fact, I follow Locke () and Wiggins (, ) in holding that there are no such cases. (Contrast Fine () and Johnston () for arguments to the contrary.) basic properties it can have simpliciter, and, hence, which non-basic properties it can have in virtue of others that are more basic, but also which properties can act as grounds for certain less basic ones. This will also bring out a further way in which Weak Formality might fail.
. The Problem
Focus on the statue/lump case. These items are fundamentally different kinds of object: one is a statue, the other a lump (of clay). Now it's often said that there's a problem regarding how the statue and the lump could differ in kind, since they are composed of the same microphysical parts. However, there is only a problem here if
we assume that what kind of thing something (fundamentally) is depends on its microphysical profile. Yet I deny that assumption. In my view, there is nothing that explains why an object is the kind of thing it is (cf. §.). The fact that an object is most fundamentally an item of kind K is not explicable in more basic terms. There is no ground for the fact that x is fundamentally a K (and not a K*). 34 Accordingly, in my view, we can accept unproblematically that the statue and the lump are (fundamentally) different kinds of thing. However, this is not to say 34 Notice that one cannot solve the problem of explaining why coincident objects x and y differ in kind despite being microphysically alike in the way that I just did unless one treats them as being ungrounded. That is part of why this assumption is crucial to this section. However, if one were able to explain how objects differ in kind despite sharing their microphysical properties, then one could solve the problem I raise in this section for believers in coincidence without having to hold that fundamental kinds are ungrounded. (Good news, I suppose, for those who find that idea distasteful.) The trouble is that it really has proven rather hard to show how objects could differ in kind despite sharing their microphysical properties, as the massive literature on the grounding problem has shown. Thus I prefer to divide and conquer: take kinds as ungrounded but then allow for explicable differences in non-basic properties between coincidents and ensure that their non-basic properties are grounded. (For that is precisely the view we end up with by the end of the present sub-section.) that coincident items pose no problems at all. Indeed, that such items can and do differ in their non-basic properties poses a real problem that demands a solution. 35 Note first that when it comes to material things, it's plausible to think their non-basic properties are (ultimately) grounded in underlying basic microphysical properties. If x is a material object and if F is some non-basic property of x, then plausibly there is some microphysical property M x has such that x is F in virtue of having M. This view is standardly referred to as Microphysicalism. 36 We now focus on an example. Consider the fact that whilst the statue is beautiful, the lump it is coincident with is not. We thus get:
() The statue is beautiful.
() The lump is not beautiful.
The trouble is that from the plausible premise that being beautiful is a non-basic property, plus Microphysicalism, we can derive a contradiction from () and (). At least, this is given that Weak Formality holds. Now here is the rest of the argument: 35 In effect the problem that I focus on in what follows is a form of the 'intra-object version' of the 'grounding problem'-that of explaining how coincident objects x and y could differ in terms of Fness despite both of them sharing the base property G in virtue of which x but not y is F. (But what I say does nothing to solve the inter-object version of the problem, which arises because plausibly, if coincidents x and y differ in non-basic property Fness, they have the same microphysical parts, and surely the object that is F has that property because of how its atoms are. But then why do the properties and relations of their shared atoms give rise to Fness in x but not in y? Again, what follows does nothing to solve this form of the problem (for some possible solutions see Bader: manuscript-c The problem: () and () engender the contradiction that the lump both is and isn't beautiful. Moreover, the problem is quite general. For given Microphysicalism and Weak Formality, we end up facing this issue whenever coincident objects differ in terms of some non-basic property.
One way to react here would be to reject Microphysicalism. Another option would be to claim that all differences between coincident objects are ungrounded (fundamental) differences. However, these moves seem implausible. Moreover, there is a better way. For, we can instead put to work the notion of kind-dependent grounding (see §). We can then reject Weak Formality, and block the inference from () and () to ().
My response depends on the intuitive claim that whilst the statue is the kind of thing that can be beautiful, the same is not true of the lump of clay. Now I will just say here that this claim feels correct to me. If something is a statue, it is the sort of thing that can be beautiful, whereas if something is a lump (of clay), then it is not  the kind of thing that can be beautiful. 37 Let us suppose that we accept this claim.
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Then if we grant that being beautiful is a non-basic property of the statue, and also grant Microphysicalism, we must accept that there's some microphysical property, M, in virtue of which the statue is beautiful. However, if the statue is only able to be beautiful given it's the kind of thing able to have this property, then what we have is a case of kind-dependent grounding. That is, we have a case wherein, although () is true, it is true only given that the object in question (the statue) is a certain kind of thing. It follows that claim () is more perspicuously written as follows:
(*) There is some microphysical property, M, such that the statue is beautiful in virtue of having M, whereby this grounding relation holds only given that the statue is the kind of thing it is.
On this view, whilst the statue is beautiful in virtue of having M, that the statue has M makes it so that it is beautiful only given that it meets the condition of being a certain kind of thing. Call the particular statue x. We can then put this point by saying: the fact <that x has M> grounds the further fact <that x is beautiful> only given that x meets the condition of being the kind of thing that can be beautiful (which it does, given that x is a statue). In short, x's fundamental kind enables the 37 One might argue to the contrary that whenever lumps of clay and statues are coincident, both items will be beautiful. But this is not a worry for me, for whilst it would show, were it true, that lumps are not the kind of thing that cannot be beautiful, it would also show that beauty, at least when it come to statues and lumps, is not one of the properties apt to generate instances of problem I am concerned with. (More generally, whenever the constituting item shares the non-basic property with the constituted item, then we do not have an instance of the problem I am dealing with.) 38 Again, one could also accept a variation on this claim, according to which the statue but not the lump is able to beautiful because it has a certain form, or manner of composition,…etc. grounding relation to obtain between the grounding fact <that x has M> and the grounded fact <that x is beautiful>.
This view implies that having microphysical property M is not sufficient for being beautiful. For in addition, an item must meet the condition of being the sort of thing that can instantiate the property of being beautiful. Thus, were something not be the kind of thing that can be beautiful, then even if it had microphysical property M it would not be beautiful for that reason. So Weak Formality fails, and the same is true for the more specific (). For, if being beautiful requires being a certain kind of thing, then being beautiful in virtue of having microphysical property M requires being a certain kind of thing as well.
Instead of (), however, what is true is something more like:
(*) If any object whatsoever has microphysical property M, then if that object is the kind of thing that can be beautiful, it is beautiful in virtue of having M.
This reformulation then suggests a more general re-formulation of Weak Formality.
Again, that principle was stated in the following way earlier in the paper ( §):
Weak Formality:
(F) (G) (x) (Gx < Fx) → (y) (Gy → (Gy < Fy))
I now suggest that we replace this principle with the following: (letting 'KF' stand for the predicate 'is the kind of thing that is able to be F'):
 Kind-Dependent Formality:
Let us sum up. Once we recognise that cases of kind-dependent grounding, we can resolve in a compelling way a problem that arises for those who claim that there are differences in non-basic properties between coincidents. This strategy, however, requires rejecting Weak Formality, replacing it with Kind-Dependent Formality.
Thus, there is motivation for rejecting the former principle, and replacing it with the latter-at least for those with certain background metaphysical commitments (those that in fact many contemporary philosophers share).
Moreover, it seems that this basic strategy can be employed to solve a whole range of similar problems. For if we grant Microphysicalism, then we face exactly the same problem whenever we wish to allow that coincident objects differ regarding any non-basic property. So since it seems plausible to think that whenever such objects differ in their non-basic properties in this way, this is traceable to some difference in fundamental kind, we can employ the same basic strategy as above in order to avoid contradiction when wishing to claim that the coincident objects genuinely differ in terms of the non-basic property.
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39 It is of note that if indeed we can maintain that whenever coincident objects differ in terms of some non-basic property, this can always (at least in some sense) be traced back to a difference in fundamental kind between them, then we can offer a compelling answer to what Koslicki () calls the 'similarity problem'. (We could even make headway with this problem if we claimed that many, if not all, cases of coincidents differing in non-basic properties involves the propertydifferences tracing to their kinds.) Essentially, the problem is to explain not only how the coincident objects manage to differ in certain ways, but also why in certain respects they are the same. That is, we have to explain why some properties (like mass) are shared, whilst others are not shared (like beauty). My answer is that the shared properties are either those that are not kind-dependent or those that are kind-dependent but that can be had by both statues and lumps. Whereas those that are not shared are "kind-dependent properties" that can be had only by statues and not lumps/only by lumps and not statues. Given this view, I submit, we can offer a plausible and principled account as to why (e.g.) the statue and the lump differ with respect to certain properties but not others.
For instance, by appealing to the kind-dependent grounding strategy, we might be able to make headway with the longstanding problem regarding modal differences between material things. For it is plausible to hold that these modal differences are in some way at least traceable to a difference in fundamental kind. 40 We might also be able to make headway with the important problem as to how persons and their bodies manage to differ in consciousness. 41 For plausibly, this difference seems traceable in some sense to the fact that whilst the person is the kind of thing that can be conscious, the same is not true of the body. Consider the following case. We have a piece of metal constituting a statue. In this particular case, the piece of metal is not valuable, but the statue is. But one might think that it is just not true that things of the kind piece of metal are (in virtue of their kind) unable to be valuable. For perhaps some pieces of metal are valuable whilst some others are not.
The more general problem is this. It might be that x and y are coincident and so share microphysical properties. Yet they differ in non-basic property F. My way to 40 Cf. Fine (, p. ) 'we ask how it is possible for the piece of alloy to survive being moulded into the shape of a sphere but not possible for the statue, then the answer which most naturally suggests itself is that it is because the one is a piece of alloy and the other is a statue of Goliath that they enjoy the capacities or incapacities for variation in shape that they do.' 41 Indeed, I argue in Moran (manuscript-b) that each of us is coincident with a distinct object that is plausibly non-conscious-at least given any plausible materialist view (even Animalism or the view that we are our Bodies, if these are distinct). So it is of considerably importance to be able to solve this problem-for if materialism as such gave rise to 'too many thinkers' that would suggest that materialism as such is false (see Zimmerman:  for this basic style of argument).
42 Indeed, it just sounds wrong to say that my body is thinking. As David Wiggins writes, in connection with the idea that we human persons are identical with our bodies, so that our bodies are thinking beings with the same full range of mental capacities as ourselves '…there is something extremely unnatural-so unnatural that the upshot is simply falsity-in the proposition that people's bodies play chess, talk sense, know arithmetic, or even run or jump or sit down.' (Wiggins: , pp. -, cf. Fine: , p.  and Johnston: , p. .)
43 I thank an anonymous referee for raising it.
avoid contradiction is to claim that if, say, x lacks F whilst y has it, then x is the kind of thing that cannot be F, and so cannot be F in virtue of the base properties it shares with y ( §.). But perhaps this won't cover all cases. For perhaps whilst x is not F, other things of the same fundamental kind as x are in fact F.
Let's grant for the sake of argument that such cases are possible. My response is to invoke a different way in which fundamental kinds can condition what grounding relations objects can enter into. Consider the case of the piece of metal that is not valuable-the one that is coincident with a statue that is valuable. By Microphysicalism, plus Weak Formality, the piece of metal ought to be valuable when it is not. Yet I cannot respond by saying that the piece of metal is not the kind of thing that can be valuable and so not the kind of thing that can be valuable in virtue of the microphysical property M that makes the statue valuable, granting that some pieces of metal can be valuable. What can be said, however, is that pieces of metal are not the kind of thing that can be valuable in virtue of having microphysical property M. Regarding those pieces of metal that are valuable, they must be valuable in virtue of having different base properties than those pieces of metal that are not valuable. And so they must be valuable in virtue of having different base properties to that base property the piece of metal coincident with the statue (the one that is not valuable) shares with that statue, namely, microphysical property M.
N.b. this view is not ad hoc. For if kinds can determine what non-basic proper-
ties a thing can have, should they not also be able to determine which base properties can (conditionally) ground certain of their non-basic properties? (That is: it should be possible that for things of kind K, being of kind K means that you can be F in virtue of basic property G, but not F in virtue of basic property H, etc.)

Moreover, this view has the virtue of explaining why some instances of a kind can have non-basic property F whilst others cannot (if indeed this can be so). The answer is: their kind determines that certain base properties can make them F whilst others can't.
We now see another way in which Weak Formality might fail. This thesis claims that if x and y both have G, and if x is F in virtue of being G, then both must be F in virtue of being G. I showed one way in which this might be false in ( §.). The second reason I now offer why this thesis might be false is that there might be cases wherein x lacks F and y has it, yet whilst x is the kind of thing that can be F, it is not the kind of thing that can be F in virtue of being G-even if it is the kind of thing that can be F in virtue of being H, or J, etc. Again, this means that fundamental kinds can determine not only which non-basic properties a thing can have, and hence which non-basic properties a thing can have in virtue of which base properties, but also which base properties are able to make instances of the relevant kind have certain non-basic properties.
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 Thinking Parts I have argued that the notion of kind-dependent grounding can do useful metaphysical work within the context of a view that allows for non-basic differences between coincident entities ( §). In this section, I show that this notion can also do 44 This response might require us to modify Weak Formality even further. For instead of replacing it with Kind-Dependent Formality, we might now need to replace it with (letting 'KG' stands for the predicate 'is the kind of thing such that, if it is G, then it is F in virtue of being G'):  valuable work even if we don't countenance coincident things. My strategy will be to consider a problem that arises even if we don't allow for coinciding objects, before explaining how appealing to kind-dependent grounding can solve it.
The problem is known as the 'thinking parts problem'.
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The trouble is that whilst it seems like I'm the only conscious being in my vicinity, there's an argument that I-like all other human persons-contain a 'mighty host' of conscious beings within my borders. Yet clearly this is absurd. For ' [t] here is not a mighty host of conscious, reflective, pain-and pleasure-feeling objects now sitting in my chair, now wearing my shirt, now thinking about this paper' (Merricks: , p. ).
The problem turns on two plausible ideas. The first of these is that at least some of our conscious properties are intrinsic. (In general, a property is intrinsic just in case the things that have it do so solely in virtue of how they are in themselves, and not in virtue of how they are related to other (disjoint) things. But this no analysis of intrinsicality.) Many arguments for this premise may be given-here I'll just note two considerations.
First, it seems intuitive to think that there could be a 'lonely' object that is conscious (cf. Merricks: , ). That is, it seems that something could be conscious despite being the only object that exists. This suggests that at least some conscious properties are intrinsic properties. For if a lonely being can be conscious, then there are at least some conscious properties that a lonely being can have. These 'isolation test'-i.e., if it's instantiable by a lonely object-this is a strong indicator that it's intrinsic.) Second, there is the intuition that an intrinsic duplicate of one of us would have to be conscious. Consider for example 'swampman', an intrinsic duplicate of one of us 'forged by fortuitous happenings in a swamp' (cf. Hawthorne: , n. ).
Many of us share the intuition that swampman would have to be conscious, due to being an intrinsic duplicate of a conscious being (one of us). This again suggests that there are at least some intrinsic conscious properties. For it seems to suggest that at least some such properties are necessarily shared by intrinsic duplicates.
The second core premise concerns the grounds of our intrinsic conscious properties. The core claim is that if a material thing has some conscious property F, then there is some intrinsic microphysical property M, such that the object has F in virtue having M. This second premise flows from three ideas. The first is the idea that consciousness is a non-basic property of persons and therefore grounded in some more basic property (or congeries thereof). The second is the idea, already encountered in ( §) , that the non-basic properties of material objects are grounded in their microphysical properties (Microphysicalism). The third idea is that in general, intrinsic properties have intrinsic grounds. Given the first two claims, it follows that when a person has a conscious property, she has this property in virtue of having some more basic microphysical property (or congeries of microphysical properties; but we will focus on the simpler caes). The third idea then ensures that the microphysical properties that ground our intrinsic conscious properties are themselves intrinsic. Now consider some arbitrary human person, P. And let 'P-minus' denote that large proper part of P that consists of all of P minus his left foot. (N.b. clearly P and  P-minus are distinct, for no object is identical to one of its proper parts. And things that are distinct are necessarily so.) Lastly, consider some other human person, Q, which has all of the same intrinsic microphysical properties as P. 46 We now suppose that Q loses his left foot and survives.
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This means that Q is no longer an intrinsic microphysical duplicate of P, but rather an intrinsic microphysical duplicate of P-minus. Consequently, Q and P-minus now share all their intrinsic microphysical properties. Now from the first premise set out above-that at least some of our conscious properties are intrinsic-we can suppose that Q instantiates (after the loss of his left foot) some intrinsic conscious property C. Then, given the second core premise, which tells us that intrinsic conscious properties always have intrinsic microphysical grounds, we can then infer that Q has C in virtue of having some intrinsic microphysical property M. So we get:
() Q has intrinsic conscious property C in virtue of having intrinsic microphysical property M.
This then implies:
() Q has intrinsic microphysical property M. 46 For present purposes, we can think of the intrinsic microphysical properties of an object as being a function of its individual intrinsic properties of, and the spatiotemporal and causal relations obtaining between, its microphysical parts (cf. Merricks: ). Given this conception of an intrinsic microphysical property, there is no barrier to supposing that two persons (or a person and a large proper part thereof) might be intrinsic microphysical duplicates. 47 There is a delicate question as to what happens here, i.e. in cases where an object O loses a part P but survives, thus seemingly becoming coincident with what once was a large proper part of it O-P (i.e. the part that comprised all of O besides P). For my views of this matter see Moran ().
we get:
() P-minus has intrinsic microphysical property M.
But by Weak Formality, we can infer from () that:
() If any object whatsoever has intrinsic microphysical property M, then it has conscious property C in virtue of having M.
From () and () we then infer:
() P-minus has conscious property C in virtue of having intrinsic microphysical property M.
And this entails:
() P-minus has conscious property C.
And this implies:
 () P-minus is conscious.
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At this point, we have proven that the human person, P, contains a conscious proper part, namely, P-minus. But the reasoning here could easily be extended to prove, not only that P-minus contains a whole multitude of such conscious parts, but also that the same is true for every one of us. It is in this way that we end up with the absurd result that each one of us contains manifold conscious beings.
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There are various ways in which one might respond to this problem. One could contest the (implicit) idea that human persons are complex material beings-and hence the kind of thing that can have intrinsic microphysical properties. It seems to me that each of these options is rather radical. It is certainly radical to hold, in line with either the first or the last option, that we aren't complex mate-48 I assume here that having at least one conscious property is sufficient for being conscious. Given that conscious properties are determinates of the determinable consciousness, this claim follows from the more general idea that having a determinate of some determinable is sufficient for having the determinable itself. 49 This conclusion is absurd in and of itself. But it also gives rise to various troubling ethical problems and absurdities. See Johnston () and Unger (, ).
50 Compare here Unger (, ) and Zimmerman (), who, in connection with two other problems which seem to over-generate conscious beings, advocate adopting an immaterialist view on which we human persons are immaterial entities. (Compare also Robinson: , who recommends that we deny that we are material beings, and hold instead that we are events constituted by the activities of such beings, in order to handle the thinking parts problem. Kovacs:  offers an interesting discussion and critique of this idea.) rial things, and/or that we do not have large undetached proper parts. The more plausible view is surely that we are complex material things, with various large proper parts, including heads and an upper-halves, etc. It also looks quite radical to hold either that there are no intrinsic conscious properties, or that such properties are not microphysically grounded. We are therefore left with but one option: reject Weak Formality and thereby block the inference from () and () to (). This is the answer to the thinking parts problem I recommend. On this view, there is a difference in fundamental kind between we persons and our large proper parts, such that whilst we human persons are the kind of object that can be conscious and have mental properties, the same is not true of our (large) proper parts.
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Given this view, it follows that all conscious properties are "kind-dependent properties", which can be had only by things of certain kinds. We can then claim that when the person, Q, has conscious property C, she has this property in virtue of intrinsic microphysical property M only given that she is the sort of object able to instantiate conscious properties. If this is right, then it follows that () is more perspicuously written as: (*) Q has intrinsic conscious property C in virtue of having intrinsic microphysical property M, whereby this grounding relation holds only given that Q is the kind of thing that it is. 51 This view presupposes no particular view about what kind of thing we human persons most fundamentally are. It states only that whatever kind of thing we are, things of that kind are able to be conscious (at least in propitious circumstances), whilst the same is not true of our large proper parts. But surely that is a plausible claim-regardless of what kind of thing we turn out to be, or that our proper parts turn out to be, for that matter; for an argument to that effect see my (under review).

Moreover, claim () will have to be rejected, in favour of: (*) If any object whatsoever has intrinsic microphysical property M, then if that object is the kind of thing that can be conscious, it has conscious property C in virtue of having microphysical property M.
Just as before, accepting (*) in place of () implies that we should abandon Weak Formality, and replace it with Kind-Dependent Formality (cf. § above).
The crucial point here is that if (*) is true instead of (), then we can no longer obtain (), () and (), and hence, we can avoid the conclusion that each of us contains a mighty host of conscious proper parts. Moreover, we do not have to make any of the radical moves noted above that other authors have made.
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Thus, on the proposed view, our intrinsic conscious properties are grounded by intrinsic microphysical properties. Moreover, there are large proper parts of human persons that share these intrinsic microphysical properties. However, these large proper parts do not instantiate intrinsic conscious properties, despite instantiating their (conditional) microphysical grounds. This is because such properties can only be instantiated by things of a certain kind. Since the large proper parts of human persons are not the kind of thing that can be conscious-a claim that seems to be 52 One might wonder if we have only gained a Pyrrhic victory here. For we have staved off having to saying that consciousness is brute-but at the cost of having to introduce brute fundamental kinds. Two points are to be made here. We can distinguish between how something is and what something is (cf. §). To say that something is conscious seems clearly to say merely how it is (cf. van Inwagen: , pp. -). So it does not seem plausible to take consciousness as basic. Whereas to specify the fundamental kind of an object is to disclose its nature: to specify what it is. Thus it does seem, by contrast, much more plausible to treat fundamental kinds as basic (i.e. ungrounded).
The second thing to say is that one could pursue this strategy by treating the kind that we persons fall under as grounded but extrinsic. However, this requires accepting that there can be extrinsic conditions on the possession of an intrinsic property-for again, we wish to retain the view that at least some conscious properties are intrinsic. I explain how this goes in Moran (under review). intuitive enough-it follows that the large proper parts of human persons do not have any conscious properties, despite some of them having all the necessary microphysical properties.
53
Rejecting Weak Formality, therefore, and replacing it with Kind-Dependent Formality provides us with an attractive way to handle the thinking parts problem.
For if the former principle is replaced by the latter, then, given the intuitive claim that whilst persons are the kind of thing that can be conscious, the same is not true of their (large) proper parts, it follows that even though persons and the large proper parts thereof can have the same intrinsic microphysical properties, it is only ever the persons, never their parts, that are conscious in virtue of having such properties.
Therefore, since the thinking parts problem arises even for those who don't believe in coincident things, there may be reason for everyone-not just those who accept coincident objects-to hold that Weak Formality fails, and that the closest thing that holds instead is Kind-Dependent Formality.
It might be noted, moreover, that this reply to the thinking parts problem can be extended to handle a whole range of related problems, which arise whenever two or more material objects (that differ in kind) fail to share some non-basic intrinsic property whilst being intrinsic microphysical duplicates. For whenever such cases 53 One might wonder whether this view is really consistent with taking some of our conscious properties to be intrinsic. After all, this view seems to imply that Lewisian duplicates (things that have precisely the same perfectly natural properties and relations) can differ in terms of these properties (we can imagine a person and a proper part of some person that are Lewisian duplicates), yet one could reasonably take this to show that none of these properties is intrinsic. I have tackled this objection elsewhere, and so I won't address it here (see my manuscript-c). Suffice it to say that so far as I can see, the present proposal does not in any way impugn the claim that at least some of our conscious properties are intrinsic. (Note for instance that on the present view, the allegedly intrinsic conscious properties only ever have intrinsic grounds. This is arguably sufficient to show that such properties are intrinsic. Note also that whilst my proposal makes the instantiation of intrinsic conscious properties in some sense dependent on an object's fundamental kind, this does not threaten the status of those properties as intrinsic. Things would be otherwise if fundamental kinds were extrinsic. However, fundamental kinds are intuitively intrinsic to their instances-this being twice as plausible if we take fundamental kinds to be ground-theoretically fundamental also, for is basic or fundamental in the ground-theoretic sense is plausibly intrinsic (cf. Bader: ).
arise, e.g. when intrinsic duplicates x and y are such that x has intrinsic property F and y lacks it, we can say that whilst the objects share their microphysical properties, these properties can do their grounding work only in the case of x and not in the case of y, for it is only x that is the kind of thing that can instantiate the relevant non-basic intrinsic property in question.
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The solution to the thinking parts problem developed here, therefore, suggests a more general style of a reply to a broader range of problems. These share a common structure: they arise whenever two material objects (that differ in kind) are intrinsic microphysical duplicates and yet differ regarding some non-basic intrinsic property.
 Conclusion
The thesis of Weak Formality tells us that if one thing a is F in virtue of being G, then any possible object that is G is F in virtue of being G. What I have argued here is that despite its intuitive appeal, one can plausibly reject this principle, by appealing to cases of kind-dependent grounding. Specifically, I have argued that there is theoretical utility in treating certain cases as being cases of kinddependent grounding, whereby these cases show that Weak Formality fails.
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To do this, I have focused on two metaphysical problems. The first arises if we grant (as many philosophers do) that coincident objects (of different kinds) can 54 Think for example of the statue and an intrinsic microphysical duplicate of it which is a mere proper part of some larger block of marble. Intuitively, only the statue is intrinsically beautiful. I suggest we can account for this, despite the fact that it has the same intrinsic microphysical properties as the embedded hunk of marble, and whilst preserving Microphysicalism, by saying that only the statue is the kind of thing that can be intrinsically beautiful.
55 I also argued, in ( §.), that Weak Formality might fail because whilst two coincident objects x and y are G, and whilst x and y are both the kind of thing that can be F, the reason x is F (in virtue of being G) and y is not is that only x is the kind of thing for which Gness is an Fness-grounding property. Cf. here fn. . differ in terms of their non-basic properties. The problem is that since the properties are non-basic, it is hard to see how the coincident entities could fail to share them, without ending up facing contradiction. The second problem arises even without the assumption that entities can coincide. Here the trouble is that it can apparently be shown that each of us contains manifold conscious proper parts. Yet evidently this is not the case.
What I have tried to show is that both problems can be given elegant solutions if we appeal to the notion of kind-dependent grounding, and thus reject Weak Formality. I submit that this gives us good reason to reject this principle, and to believe that there are genuine cases of kind-dependent grounding.
In short, we began by asking whether it is so that if one thing, a, is F in virtue of being G, does it follow that everything that is G must be F for that reason? The answer is that there appears to be good reason not to accept this. For it appears that maintaining otherwise, by holding that there can be cases of kind-dependent grounding, has theoretical utility, insofar as it enables us to solve a range of metaphysical problems. (It may even be serviceable for solving problems I have yet to consider. I would encourage the reader to explore whether or not this is the case.
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